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Theories of perception seek to explain how sensory data are processed to identify
previously experienced objects, but they usually do not consider the decisions and
effort that goes into acquiring the sensory data. Identification of objects according
to their tactile properties requires active exploratory movements. The sensory data
thereby obtained depend on the details of those movements, which human subjects
change rapidly and seemingly capriciously. Bayesian Exploration is an algorithm that uses
prior experience to decide which next exploratory movement should provide the most
useful data to disambiguate the most likely possibilities. In previous studies, a simple
robot equipped with a biomimetic tactile sensor and operated according to Bayesian
Exploration performed in a manner similar to and actually better than humans on a
texture identification task. Expanding on this, “Bayesian Action&Perception” refers to the
construction and querying of an associative memory of previously experienced entities
containing both sensory data and the motor programs that elicited them. We hypothesize
that this memory can be queried (i) to identify useful next exploratory movements during
identification of an unknown entity (“action for perception”) or (ii) to characterize whether
an unknown entity is fit for purpose (“perception for action”) or (iii) to recall what actions
might be feasible for a known entity (Gibsonian affordance). The biomimetic design of this
mechatronic system may provide insights into the neuronal basis of biological action and
perception.
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CAN ROBOTS PERCEIVE IN THE SAME MANNER AS HUMANS?
How can we reconcile the apparently chaotic behavior of humans exploring their environment with
their extremely effective judgment? The brains of higher primates are extraordinarily good at inter-
preting, learning, and recognizing complex situations and formulating appropriate responses to
them, yet the details of their behaviors while doing so are maddeningly noisy to the experimental
observer and inconsistent with the deterministic behavior expected of optimally engineered systems.
Humans observing a visual scene cause their eyes to dart in sequences of saccades that seem capri-
cious and are often repetitive (Yarbus and Riggs, 1967). Humans trying to identify an object by touch
select specific movements according to the relevant properties (Jones and Lederman, 2006) but the
details tend to be inconsistent and sometimes repetitive, frequently changing posture, velocity, and
force of the fingers (Morley et al., 1983; Smith et al., 2002, 2009). These exploratory behaviors are
neither replicable nor “machinelike” in their observable details. Nevertheless, the improvements
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in elegance, speed, and accuracy of object identification as children develop (Morrongiello et al.,
1994) suggests that exploratory movements are chosen carefully on the basis of experience.
The internal details of neural activity that must ultimately be the cause of exploratory behaviors
are also not machinelike or consistent. Even when the motor behavior is tightly constrained to be
repetitive, the activity of the individual neurons in the cerebral cortex varies wildly from trial to trial
(Churchland et al., 2006; Churchland and Shenoy, 2007). This neural activity is not random, as can
be seen by averaging data from many trials and extracting correlations with specific features of the
behavior. It is tempting to ascribe the inter-trial variability to “computational noise” and to assume
that it is overcome during individual trials by averaging together the activity of millions of noisy
neurons. Nevertheless, an engineer would wonder how such a badly designed machine manages to
perform so remarkably well.
We encountered this paradox when trying to figure out how to use a biomimetic tactile sen-
sor (BioTac® from SynTouch LLC, Los Angeles) to enable robots to perform haptic identification
(Fishel and Loeb, 2012a). The sensor has mechanical properties and sensingmodalities that are sim-
ilar to the human fingertip (Fishel et al., 2008; Wettels et al., 2008; Fishel and Loeb, 2012b; Wettels
et al., 2013), making it an ideal candidate for investigating artificial humanlike tactile character-
ization of textures. We assumed that we could program the robot to make the same exploratory
movements that have been observed in humans exploring textures (Jones and Lederman, 2006) and
then subject the sensory signals to standard signal processing and classification schemes to associate
them with distinctive properties of the object’s texture. Humans actively exploring surfaces use a
wide variety of rapidly changing forces and velocities, but they vary inexplicably between subjects
and between presentations of a single texture to a single subject; nevertheless, subjects discriminate
surfaces accurately and fairly rapidly (Morley et al., 1983; Smith et al., 2002, 2009). We initially con-
sidered that the movements observed in humans might simply be noisy and their details irrelevant,
so we tried to compute features (such as spectral patterns in skin vibrations) that might be constant
and distinctive for textures over a wide range of movement parameters. Through experimentation
it became clear that those extracted features actually did depend strongly on the contact force and
velocity of the exploratory movements. Furthermore, there was no predictable relationship across
objects; e.g., increased sliding velocity might increase a particular sensory signal for one texture but
decrease it for another. Interpreting the tactile data required judicious selection and consideration
of these exploratory parameters.
KEY CONCEPT 1 | Biomimetic
Mechatronic systems whose designs and functions are enabled by features and principles of operation found in
biological systems.
This review considers what high level strategies and internal representations might account
for complete behaviors that include both action and perception. The functional steps are illus-
trated schematically for haptic behaviors in Figure 1 and discussed later in terms of their possible
implementation by the brain. This review attempts to unify the concepts of perception and action
by drawing parallels between the visual system, which is usually considered from the perceptual
perspective, and the haptic system, which is usually considered from the action perspective.
DECISION-MAKING AND ITERATIVE EXPLORATION
The exploratory movements that humans make are variable but not because they are chosen ran-
domly or degraded by motor noise. The sequencing and details of exploratory movements seem to
be important, yet not preconceived. Bayesian inference lends itself to iterative problem-solving
in that each new piece of observed data can be used to update the probabilities of competing
KEY CONCEPT 2 | Bayesian inference
A statistical process for computing the probability (P) that a hypothesis (H) is true given new evidence (E) according
to Bayes’ rule:
P(H|E) = P(E|H) · P(H)
P(E)
where P(E|H) is the probability of observing E given that H is true; P(H) is the prior probability that H is true before
observing E; and P(E) is the probability of observing E with consideration to all possible hypotheses that could be
true.
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FIGURE 1 | Bayesian Action&Perception. A haptic system interacts with
the world through a mechanical Interface that provides access to both
Sensors and Actuators. These Physical components are connected to
Mental functions through the activities of Perception and Action. The
Mental functions consist of Bayesian Inference and Bayesian Exploration,
both capable of accessing and adding to an associative memory of
Experience according to the Motivation to achieve certain goals.
hypotheses (Bayes and Price, 1763). It starts with a distribution of
“prior probabilities” each describing the initial probability that a
particular hypothesis is true (e.g., the probability that the object
about to be explored is made of wood, metal, plastic, etc.). After
new information is received, it is possible to compute a new dis-
tribution of “posterior probabilities” based on the likelihood that
each hypothesis, if true, would have resulted in this information
(i.e., if the object were made of wood, metal, or plastic would it
feel like what was just perceived?).
Bayesian Exploration is an experience-driven algorithm that
extends this to decide which next exploratory movement is
anticipated to provide the most useful data to disambiguate the
current most-probable candidates in an object identification task.
KEY CONCEPT 3 | Bayesian Exploration
A statistical process derived from Bayesian inference to determine which
test is expected to produce evidence that best disambiguates which of sev-
eral competing hypotheses is true based on the prior probabilities of these
hypotheses and a database of experience correlating tests and the resulting
evidence for all possible hypotheses (see Figure 3).
It requires a similar experiential database of previously explored
objects that associates each object with a set of percepts, each
percept consisting of one exploratory movement and a par-
ticular sensation thereby obtained (see Figure 2). A graphical
representation of this algorithm is provided in Figure 3 (full
KEY CONCEPT 4 | Percepts
A perceived characteristic of an object resulting from a given test (e.g.,
exploratory movement) and one aspect of the sensory information that is
thereby elicited from that object.
equations in Fishel and Loeb, 2012a). In summary, the degree of
perceptual overlap that would result frommaking eachmovement
and measuring each sensation for each pair of candidate objects is
weighted by the current probabilities that the unknown is one of
those two candidate objects. The sum of the weighted overlaps for
all object pairs reflects the expected residual ambiguity if that per-
cept were to be measured. The percept that is expected to result in
the lowest residual ambiguity wins; its action is performed and the
corresponding sensation is compared with expectations to update
the Bayesian probabilities.
Bayesian probability was first proposed as a mechanism to
guide visual exploratory behaviors (Bajcsy, 1988) such as effi-
ciently directing attention to the relevant features of a complex
image (Neisser, 1976; Henson et al., 2011; Moreno-Bote et al.,
2011) or actively steering the point of view for machine vision
(Denzler et al., 2009; Browatzki et al., 2012). Bayesian ideal
observer strategy has been applied successfully to explain the
patterns of saccadic eye movements that humans use to locate
a known, low-visibility object buried in visual noise (Najemnik
and Geisler, 2005). Statistically optimal models have been devel-
oped to decide what new data to obtain when training a machine
learning algorithm (Cohn et al., 1996). Lindley used Shannon
information theory to derive a similar approach to deciding which
experiment will be more informative (Lindley, 1956).
Bayesian Exploration turned out to be an excellent strategy
for our problem of machine touch. It is optimal in the sense
that it minimizes the amount of exploration required to reach
a given level of confidence in the identity of an unknown but
previously experienced entity. It provided a formal computa-
tional procedure for the “decision rule” needed to close the
perception-action loop (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004). We built up
a robotic experiential database for 117 different texture sam-
ples, using a few exploratory movements and sensory features
similar to those employed by humans. When unknowns from
the sample set were presented, the Bayesian Exploration algo-
rithm resulted in 95% successful identifications, often correctly
identifying similar materials that humans could not discrimi-
nate despite ad libitum exploration. This is better performance
on a much larger set than has been reported previously for such
machines, which were tested on only 3–20 textures selected to be
distinctive and trivial for humans to discriminate (de Boissieu
et al., 2009; Giguere and Dudek, 2011; Jamali and Sammut,
2011; Oddo et al., 2011; Sinapov et al., 2011). More importantly
for the discussion here, the emergent behavior was qualita-
tively humanlike. Figure 4 provides examples of indecision, error,
and reconsideration similar to human behavior in such tasks
(Gallistel et al., 2004; Fishel and Loeb, 2012a). The number of
exploratory movements required was small but variable (median
∼5), and the sequence changed depending on how the proba-
bility estimates were affected by small amounts of noise (Fishel
and Loeb, 2012a). Similar variability was observed for optimal
visual saccades in a target location model (Najemnik and Geisler,
2005).
Decision-theoretic algorithms based on optimizing Bayesian
sequences have been applied to various problems in haptic per-
ception, particularly to cope with ambiguities of machine vision
(Schneider et al., 2009; Hsiao et al., 2010; Browatzki et al., 2012)
or uncertainties about object location or orientation (Hsiao et al.,
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FIGURE 2 | Bayesian representation. The internal representations of
entities A and B consist of the previously experienced associations of various
motor behaviors with various sensory feedback. The motor repertoire
consists of discrete types of movements with continuously adjustable
parameters; the sensory dimensions represent processed sensations with
continuous ranges of values. Discrimination and identification of entities
depends on finding motor-sensory associations that distinguish among the
alternatives that are currently most probable. When explored by motor
strategy 1, entities A and B result in overlapping sensory percepts a, b, c and
g, h, i, respectively. When explored by motor strategy 2, the resulting
percepts are non-overlapping for two of the three sensory dimensions (d, e
vs. j, l), so this is the better exploratory strategy to pursue. Previous
experience has also associated entity B with an affordance consisting of the
tendency to produce sensory percepts n, m, o when handled according to
motor strategy 3. Once a new object has been identified as entity B (or
sufficiently close to it), it is immediately obvious that a behavioral result
associated with sensory percepts n, m, and o can be obtained by generating
motor strategy 3.
2010; Lepora et al., 2013). Tanaka et al. recently took advantage
of its ability to learn distinguishing features empirically (Tanaka
et al., 2014) rather than requiring a priori parameterization (Saal
et al., 2010). It can also be applied to autonomous, open-ended
classification without requiring supervised learning of a specific
database (Dallaire et al., 2014). The Bayesian theoretic approach
is agnostic as to sensory modality, so it can be applied easily to
multimodal perception (Ernst and Bülthoff, 2004; Sinapov et al.,
2014).
ACTION FOR PERCEPTION vs. PERCEPTION FOR ACTION
If perception necessarily involves figuring out what (exploratory)
movement to make, then what is action? We submit that they are
the same computational process but with different motivation.
Consider a caveman walking along a rocky trail and encounter-
ing a rabbit that might provide dinner. The caveman will have
a very sophisticated classification system for rocks and pebbles of
various shapes and textures, but what matters in the moment is to
pick up a rock that is suitable for throwing accurately before the
rabbit hops away. As the caveman gropes on the ground without
looking away from the rabbit, his fingers have fleeting encoun-
ters with various objects: twigs, boulders, gravel, rocks. Rather
than identifying each object individually, the caveman seeks out
the first object that has the requisite affordances to complete his
KEY CONCEPT 5 | Affordances
The association of an object with the various actions and functions that it
enables. For example, any object with a certain size, density, and strength
affords its use as a hammer because it can be accelerated and collided
repeatedly with other objects to convey energy and/or momentum into the
other object. It would also afford use as a doorstop.
goal; this is the perception phase. Most are immediately discarded
as unsuitable because they do not afford accurate throwing with
sufficient kinetic energy to disable the rabbit, based on previous
experience performing this task. The groping is designed specif-
ically to produce a distinctive set of sensory signals from objects
that might be suitable. Upon encountering a suitable candidate,
the caveman may quickly make another exploratory movement
such as hefting to generate sensory data that is specific to the
most important property of previously thrown objects. In order
to execute the throw, the caveman does not need to compute the
requisite motor program by solving the inverse dynamics of the
limb now loaded with the rock; instead he executes the previ-
ously learned program that is currently in his mind’s eye (Loeb,
2012).The caveman moves smoothly from object perception
and identification to object manipulation and task performance.
Rather than using previous experience to recall the movement
that would yield the percepts most likely to identify an object,
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FIGURE 3 | Bayesian Exploration is used iteratively to identify an
unknown entity by selecting and executing exploratory movements to
disambiguate alternative hypotheses A–E. Prior experience with all
candidate identities is stored in a database that permits extraction of
confusion probability matrices (top center) that quantify the degree of overlap
(red) in the probability density functions (PDF) of their sensory percepts (e.g.,
Aa = sensation a resulting from using motor action 1 with entity A as
illustrated in Figure 2). The confusion matrices are then weighted (shaded
gray masks) according to the prior probabilities (green bars) of A–E, then
summed to identify the percept that will result in the lowest total confusion.
Bayesian inference is used to compute the posterior probabilities of A–E to
see if one of them exceeds a threshold value; if not, the process is repeated.
the look-up process is used instead to recall a movement that will
result in the desired sensory feedback when handling the object.
Psychophysicists and neurophysiologists historically treated
action and perception as fundamentally different behaviors under
the control of different parts of the nervous system, but the
concept of learned “ideomotor” associations (dating from the
nineteenth century) has been gaining ground (Melcher et al.,
2012). The ideomotor concept—physical actions arising with-
out conscious intent—lends itself well to largely subconscious
behaviors such as saccadic eye movements and haptic explo-
ration. More recently psychologists have emphasized the active
nature of sensory experience (O’Regan andNoë, 2001; Engel et al.,
2013); see Active vs. Passive Sensory Experience below. Bayesian
Action&Perception takes Bayesian Exploration one step further
to converge “action for perception” with “perception for action.”
KEY CONCEPT 6 | Associative memory
A biological or electronic mechanism for storing and recalling multidimen-
sional information about entities. For example, previous experience with
representatives of a particular entity will consist of concurrences between
specific motor programs whereby the representatives have been handled
and resulting sensory data. When one of these elements (e.g., the entity
identifier, the sensory data or the motor program) is entered into the asso-
ciative memory as an index, the other elements associated with that index
item are recalled as outputs.
Bayesian Exploration requires that an associative memory be
searched to identify themotor program that will generate patterns
of sensory feedback that are most distinctive for the probable
identities of the object. It seems plausible that the same mem-
ory can be searched to find the motor program that will most
likely result in a particular pattern of sensory feedback associated
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FIGURE 4 | The performance of the texture identification robot using
Bayesian Exploration with a database of 117 textures previously
explored with three exploratory movements (M1–3) and
characterized according to three sensory percepts (S1–3). At the
beginning of all four trials (A–D) with unknown samples, the probability
of any specific texture (ordinate) is 1/117. Each successive movement
and sensory percept (numbered pairings along abscissa) is selected
according to its potential to disambiguate the currently likely possibilities
(see Figure 3), resulting in a new set of probabilities for each remaining
viable candidate (colored lines). Similar to humans, the number and
sequence of exploratory movements required to make an identification is
variable and tends to be influenced by small amounts of noise in the
system (trials A and B). Early in exploration, the particular exploratory
movement chosen and percept that is thereby obtained leads to a
substantial probability for a material that is then easily rejected by a
subsequent movement (suede and cotton in trial B; Velcro in trials C
and D). Some materials such as smooth cardstock and balsa wood are
not reliably distinguishable by humans or by the robot (trials C and D).
Overall, the robot correctly identified 95.4% of the test materials in a
median of 5 exploratory movements.
with successfully attaining the desired goal once the perceptual
ambiguity is removed. Such a capability would be facilitated by
preprocessing the sensory representation to reflect the critical
control points in the related motor program, as seems to occur
when songbirds listen to vocalizations similar to those they make
themselves (Amador et al., 2013). Cohn et al. (1996) pointed out
that representing learned information as a mixture of Gaussians
(similar to the normal distributions used to represent sensory per-
cepts in Bayesian Exploration; see Figure 3) made it possible to
“invert” a learned model of input-output relationships by con-
ditioning on the outputs of the model. If the brain can build
and search such an associative memory of previously experienced
objects, this could provide immediate access to information about
the affordances of those objects (Gibson, 1977, 1988; Cisek, 2007),
even before the ambiguities of object identity were fully resolved.
The traditional division of sensory, motor, and associational
cerebral cortex flies in the face of their obviously common phy-
logeny and ontogeny and their similarities in cytoarchitecture and
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external connectivity (Diamond, 1979). Friston and colleagues
have been developing a unifying model based on prediction error
(Adams et al., 2013), originally introduced to interpret oculo-
motor behavior in visual scene analysis (Rao and Ballard, 1999).
All of our interactions with the world can be expressed as com-
parisons between the sensory information that we receive and
that which we predict based on our internal representation of
the cause-and-effect relationships that we think exist. Some of
these predictions manifest invisibly as subcortical neural compu-
tations while others are accompanied by overt movements, but
they are all computationally the same process. The “motor pro-
gram” that is recalled and regenerated to throw the rock at the
rabbit is a manifestation of the prediction that this motor output
will produce the expected set of sensory feedback: the feel of the
rock leaving the fingers, the visual trajectory and the sound of the
impact. This is not fundamentally different from looking upward
from the nose of the rabbit to confirm that it has long ears as
expected.
A UNIFYING EXPLANATION FOR MIRROR NEURONS
The convergence of perception and action may shed light on
the strange proliferation of mirror neurons in the nervous sys-
tem. The name was originally applied to premotor cortical cells
that fired similarly when a given movement was made by a
KEY CONCEPT 7 | Mirror neurons
Neurons that respond to the conjunction of real or imagined motor and sen-
sory behavior. Examples include observing the performance of a task and
planning the delayed execution of a task.
monkey or when the monkey observed another person making
that movement (di Pellegrino et al., 1992; see review Oztop et al.,
2013). However, similar activity occurs also during a hold period
between telling the subject what act will be performed and pro-
viding a GO command to initiate the act. Both mirror-like and
hold-period activity have been observed in virtually all sensory,
motor, and association areas of cortex in which researchers have
looked (Casile, 2013), as well as in the interneurons of the spinal
cord (Prut and Fetz, 1999). Another interpretation is that this
activity reflects a motor “SET” command that prepares the sys-
tem to make the observed or planned movement but falls short
of or actively inhibits the actual generation of the movement
(Vigneswaran et al., 2013). The exchange of preparatory infor-
mation with lower motor centers such as the spinal cord may
be a necessary part of the dynamics of movement generation
(Churchland et al., 2010). It may be required to handle the large
number of gains to be set in the spinal interneuronal circuitry
in order to achieve behavior that is well-coordinated by sensory
feedback (Raphael et al., 2010).
Bayesian Action&Perception hypothesizes that thinking about
an object in any way inevitably activates all the memories associ-
ated with it, which include the dynamic sequences of movements
that have been made with the object and the sensory data that
resulted from such experiences. Those sensory data are discrimi-
native only in the context of imagining the self-made movements
that led to them, so mirror-neuron-like activity should be a part
of any recall associated with sensory perception. Conversely, the
selection of a specific goal-directed movement is possible only
after evaluating the likelihood that it will lead to the sensory feed-
back associated with attaining that goal (Bonaiuto and Arbib,
2010). The diverse details of mirror neuron activity distinguished
by Oztop et al. (2013) would then reflect the computation nor-
mally performed by the part of the nervous system in which the
mirror neurons reside rather than any specific property of the
mirror neurons themselves. What distinguishes them is a require-
ment for active (but not necessarily conscious; see next section)
thought, without requiring overt or even planned motor action
(see Active vs. Passive Sensory Experience below).
WHAT DOWE IMAGINE WHENWE PERCEIVE?
The texture identification robot is an example of the utility
of Bayesian Exploration (Fishel and Loeb, 2012a), but it only
suggests plausibility for a corresponding biological mechanism.
Lacking any compelling proof of Bayesian Action&Perception in
the brain, let us indulge in some introspection. Imagine groping
in a dark room for objects on a table. Upon first contact with an
object, its most probable identity flashes into the mind’s eye (we
use “mind’s eye” figuratively to include all of the sensory modal-
ities that might be relevant to the object). That probability is
colored by any prior information about the nature of the room
(is it an office or a kitchen?). It leads inexorably to a confirmatory
exploratory movement, which results in additional sensory data
that may reinforce the mind’s eye view or cause it to fall apart in
favor of anothermind’s eye image of a different object that is more
consistent with the incoming data. Similarly, imagine yourself
watching someone else use a tool in a clumsy manner. Your mind
races one step ahead, anticipating the awkward slip and picturing
what you would have done instead to avoid it. Neural activity con-
sistent with such “active observation” has been recorded in both
dorsal premotor (Cisek and Kalaska, 2004) and primary motor
cortices (Tkach et al., 2007) of behaving monkeys.
All this mental thrashing in the absence of any actual require-
ment for sensorimotor behavior might seem like a huge waste of
effort. Like Walter Mitty (Thurber, 1939), we imagine ourselves
always “in the moment” whether preparing to perform, teaching
someone else to perform, or merely empathizing with a charac-
ter in a movie or a novel. The most obvious advantage is that
this mental activity keeps us prepared to step in and act at a
moment’s notice, a useful skill for a band of hunters. Anyone who
has played doubles in tennis or outfield in baseball has experi-
enced the danger of becoming a passive spectator rather than an
active participant. Beyond that, it may simply be impossible for
us to form any useful memories about an object without simul-
taneously representing both the sensory data and the behavioral
actions that give rise to those data.
As noted above, much of this highly purposive preparation,
exploration, and interpretation can occur largely subconsciously,
a phenomenon that was long-recognized (Helmholtz, 1867) but
has tended to be ignored by more recent focus on a singu-
lar “searchlight of attention” (Crick, 1984). Just as we are often
unaware of the logic behind or even the existence of exploratory
saccadic eye movements, so are we unaware of much of what we
do with our hands. Even the details of the sensory information are
usually suppressed in favor of the illusion that we are experiencing
what is most probable, a phenomenon that is the source of a vast
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number of sensory illusions in various modalities including tac-
tile (Hayward, 2008). It is only when the sensory data reach some
threshold of dissonance with expectations that the whole set of
exploratory movements and sensory percepts rises to the level of
awareness (MacKay, 1990).
CAN BAYESIAN ALGORITHMS BE REALIZED IN NEURAL
CIRCUITRY?
The representation of objects as Bayesian distributions of prob-
abilistic states seems attractive for many reasons. The accumula-
tion of perceptual information in the parietal cortex is consistent
with Bayesian decision-making (Beck et al., 2008). Its hypotheti-
cal realization in associative neural networks and the use of those
networks to provide corrective feedback during motor behaviors
has been described (Knill and Pouget, 2004).
Let us suppose that the internal representation of each object
is the complete associative memory of all motor programs and
consequent sensory data associated with the object (Pastor et al.,
2011). The size and organization of this associative memory must
be considered carefully for this theory to be viable over the huge
range of entities and experiences that we accumulate over a life-
time. It seems likely that the descriptions of both the motor
behaviors and the sensory data will need to be highly abstracted
in some efficient, hierarchical representation such as we might
expect from the proliferation of distinct cortical areas in primates.
The number of entities that humans learn to discriminate and
the repertoire of movements and percepts that they employ are
much larger than those that have been modeled to date. Without
careful structuring of the neural representations, this leads to
the curse of dimensionality (Ganguli and Sompolinsky, 2012).
This is the reason that the percepts illustrated in Figure 2 each
consist of an individually testable pairing of a single action with
KEY CONCEPT 8 | Curse of dimensionality
As the number of descriptors (dimensions) associated with an entity
increases, the amount of experience required to detect those associations
reliably will tend to increase exponentially. This problem is usually addressed
by either reducing the dimensionality of the data (which may be compu-
tationally expensive) or increasing the amount of training (which may be
impractical).
a simple sensation rather than simultaneously considering all
the sensations that might make up a “gestalt” representation.
Representation of learned information as mixtures of Gaussians
lends itself to both efficient storage and efficient incorpora-
tion of new experiences (Cohn et al., 1996). An effective way
for neurons to store sensory data is simply to reinforce the
synaptic projections among them that fire in specific tempo-
ral relationships (Hebb, 1949). Restricted Boltzmann machines
can self-organize complex data sets into hierarchical neural net-
works that support efficient perception (Hinton, 2012). They can
be used to learn associations among multiple sensory modali-
ties (Sinapov et al., 2014) and to account optimally (in Bayesian
terms) for differences in their reliability (Makin et al., 2013).
Hebbian learning added to a recursive sensorimotor planner
results in behaviors that change based on the most recent tasks
requested and performed (Verstynen and Sabes, 2011). An effi-
cient way to interpolate many motor behaviors from a sparsely
distributed repertoire has been modeled recently (Tsianos et al.,
2014), provided that these abstracted representations of motor
behaviors can be executed by a well-designed lower sensorimotor
system that includes contingency plans in the form of com-
plex reflexes (see below and Loeb, 2012). Marques et al. recently
demonstrated that motor programs that include such reflexes can
arise from spontaneous motor activity (Marques et al., 2014) such
as the random exploratory strategy suggested below. Interpolable
motor programs are also consistent with observations that motor
behaviors are well-represented by recurring patterns of muscle
synergy (Alessandro et al., 2013).
Bayesian Action&Perception requires a mechanism to per-
form the probability weighted calculation of the most useful next
exploratory movement to make. The cerebral cortex isn’t likely
to be solving the equations behind the machine version of the
process illustrated in Figure 3 (Fishel and Loeb, 2012a). In fact,
deciding among competing demands for action is a common
function performed even formore primitive behaviors. For exam-
ple, the superior colliculus (midbrain tectum) decides on which
saccade to make in the face of multiple salient stimuli in differ-
ent parts of the visual space (Fecteau and Munoz, 2006). This
requires only a highly parallel array of reciprocally inhibitory neu-
rons, a common feature of many parts of the nervous system
including the cerebral cortex (Isaacson and Scanziani, 2011). A
similar process may be apparent in motor cortical activity as a
monkey simultaneously considers multiple trajectories through
an obstructed space and finally makes a selection (Churchland
et al., 2010).
It is important to distinguish the general strategy of Bayesian
decision-making from the tactics of optimality that have been
developed to implement it using mathematical algorithms (Loeb,
2012). Optimality is a methodology that rests on a belief system.
It requires that our corner of the universe be sufficiently deter-
ministic that there exists an optimal path through it and that the
rewards of following that unique path exceed the costs of finding
it. Often neither is true. A more appropriate question for this sec-
tion would have been “Can Bayesian algorithms be approximated
by neural circuitry?” Interestingly, approximate solutions to com-
putationally intense Bayesian equations are an active research
topic in machine learning and robotics (Kwisthout et al., 2011;
Bitzer et al., 2014).
VALUATION OF ACTION AND PERCEPTION
The confidence level for our texture discrimination task was set
arbitrarily to 99%, but an acceptable level would normally depend
on motivation, e.g., the trade-off between the need for a speedy
decision vs. the consequences of a mistaken identification (see
example of throwing a stone above). If an object is sufficiently
dissimilar to any previously experienced, the confidence threshold
will never be exceeded. At some point, the organism must decide
to create in its database a new entity consisting of the percepts
(i.e., motor commands and sensory feedback) associated with
exploring that entity. This requires some way to save the motor
and sensory data associated with those unresolved explorations,
as opposed to simply reinforcing the associative memory with the
uninteresting observations of familiar objects. Valuation against
prior experience and acquisition of new memories are functions
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FIGURE 5 | Theory of computation for Bayesian Action&Perception.
The associative memory in the various areas of cerebral cortex interprets
incoming sensory data in the light of current hypotheses about the
potential identity of objects (Perceptual) and selects an output that it
expects will confirm that hypothesis by generating new sensory data
(Proactive). Orderly development, use and refinement of this cortical
database requires three major supporting functions that also require some
form of learning: Value judgments are required to decide what level of
certainty is acceptable for the identity and expected behavior of an
unknown object, tentatively ascribed to the basal ganglia (Bornstein and
Daw, 2011). If no acceptable identification is possible, then these
unreconciled associations of motor strategies and sensory feedback that
have been experienced with the unknown object must be remembered and
eventually turned into a compressed, efficient representation of a new
entity in cerebral cortex, tentatively ascribed to hippocampus (Winocur
et al., 2010; Petrantonakis and Poirazi, 2014). The learned, abstract motor
strategies need to be coordinated with lower level sensorimotor systems
(e.g., spinal cord and brainstem) that can activate and stabilize complex
body movements, tentatively ascribed to cerebellum (Thach, 2014).
that predate the evolution of cerebral cortex and that require
global access to multimodal sensory and motor information. This
suggests that these supportive functions are performed by subcor-
tical structures; one such scheme is described in Figure 5 and its
legend.
At any time, the Bayesian Exploration algorithm must have
a current best guess as to what entity is actually present based
on whatever priors it has. The confidence threshold merely tells
the machine when to stop exploring. Any new physical entity
will first be classified as the most likely one of the previously
experienced physical entities because those are the only men-
tal entities that the brain has. The brain may then realize that
the probability has become stuck below the current confidence
threshold. This would imply that a new mental entity should
be created within the region of hyperspace currently occupied
by the closest extant mental entity. Therefore, the decision to
create a new mental entity is essentially the decision to split
an extant mental entity into two. The nature of the split and
the two new mental entities should not be taken lightly because
they now become the basis for the entire future performance
and development of the organism. If the split is motivated by
a failure to predict an affordance correctly (as proposed above),
then the nature and consequences of the failure can be used
to provide valuations in order to inform this splitting process.
Valuation and enablement have been proposed for the relation-
ship between the motor cortex and the basal ganglia (Doya and
Kimura, 2009). Bayesian Action&Perception generates a paral-
lel requirement for sensory cortical regions, which are known to
have similar connectivity with basal ganglia (Bornstein and Daw,
2011).
The texture discrimination robot described by Fishel and Loeb
(2012a) starts with a complete and static relational database, but
a real brain must acquire such a database from scratch and must
continuously update it to deal with newly experienced objects
and changing performance requirements. At an early develop-
mental stage when experience has been limited and the internal
representation of the world is very sparse, there will be a natural
tendency to accept quickly that a new physical entity is one of the
few, already experienced entities that are represented by a corre-
sponding mental entity. If the new physical entity does not then
behave as predicted by the mental entity, there will also be a natu-
ral tendency to create quickly a newmental entity in the database.
As the database fills out with more experience, more exploration
will be required to discriminate among similar physical entities
and there will be less motivation to create new mental entities.
It is tempting to ascribe age-specific tendencies such as “jump-
ing to conclusions” and “being stuck in a rut” to the predictable
ontological consequences of Bayesian Action&Perception.
ITERATION RATE
The rate at which successive exploratory movements are executed
has interesting parallels with temporal phenomena observed in
cerebral cortex. Cortically mediated, exploratory saccadic eye-
movements tend to occur about 3 times per second, whereas
subcortically mediated express saccades can occur in 100ms
(Munoz and Wurtz, 1992). The number of scene details that can
be discovered and recalled at the cortical saccade rate is quite low
(Melcher and Kowler, 2001), suggesting that the brain is already
looking for something specific rather than just collecting infor-
mation. The identification of significant or “oddball” items (i.e.,
something that agrees or disagrees with a strong expectation) in
a complex image is associated with the P300 EEG wave, a pos-
itive potential occurring over the relevant cortical area 300ms
after the stimulus is presented (Chapman and Bragdon, 1964).
Both of these cortical phenomena are automatic and subcon-
scious in their details but enabled by mental concentration. It is
true that cortical systems are capable of pipelining information
to achieve higher rates of throughput such as when processing
tachistoscopic images at 8–10 frames/s (Farwell and Donchin,
1988). Subcortical and even cortical loops are capable of gener-
ating previously programmed reflexive and corrective responses
at 60–100ms latency (Gribble et al., 2002; Scott, 2004; Johansson
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and Flanagan, 2007; Kurtzer et al., 2008; Perfiliev et al., 2010).
Iterative decision-making such as Bayesian Exploration, however,
seems likely to be limited to∼3 sensorimotor cycles/s. This would
allow time for physical exploration plus acquisition of sufficient
data from all sensorymodalities and processing by their respective
cortical areas to contribute relevant information.
ACTIVE vs. PASSIVE SENSORY EXPERIENCE
The effectiveness of active vs. passive touch has been long debated.
While the importance—even the inevitability—of integrating
self-generated movement with tactile sensing and perception has
long been recognized (Katz, 1925; Jones and Lederman, 2006;
Prescott et al., 2011), humans can perform passive tactile dis-
crimination tasks quite well as long as the applied movement is
predictable and relevant to the perceptual discrimination task, as
is often constructed for psychophysical experiments (Lederman,
1981). This capability is not surprising because “passive touch”
is really a degenerate case of active tactile discrimination. If the
object itself is moving, then the subject’s exploratory movement
is simply to not move. As long as the relative motion between the
object and the fingertip is relevant and similar to what a human
would select to perform on a stationary object, such discrimi-
nation performance is unsurprising. Passive touch performance
might even be superior if the movements controlled by the appa-
ratus have less motor noise and variability than would otherwise
be produced by active touch (Fishel and Loeb, 2012a). However,
passive touch breaks down when the movement of the object
does not yield relevant information for the discrimination and
the observer is powerless to select another exploratory movement
that may gain information.
Theories of visual information processing have become pro-
gressively more complex as they contend with changes in the
apparent receptive fields of cortical units as a result of attention
with and without overt eye movements (Reynolds and Heeger,
2009). Rather than interpreting these effects as a modulation of
the visual response, perhaps the data can instead be interpreted as
visual feedback modulating an expectation that simultaneously
motivates an exploratory behavior. That exploratory behavior
might be manifest as actual saccadic eye movements, but only
when not suppressed by the experimental design. It would also
be accompanied by a “mind’s eye” visualization of the expected
stimulus (Adams et al., 2013), not unlike mirror neuron behavior.
The actual visual input would then be compared to the expected
stimulus to confirm or refute the current mental hypothesis about
the source of the stimuli (Adams et al., 2013).
Similarly to vision, tactile afferent activity appears to be pro-
cessed differently by somatosensory cortex depending on whether
it arose from passive or active touch (Chapman, 1994; Ackerley
et al., 2012). If active exploratory movements are a manifestation
of attention in the tactile domain, then this contingent behavior
of somatosensory cortex may reflect the same mental hypothe-
sizing as in visual cortex. The locus of that hypothesis formation
is likely in other, “associational” cortical areas. Attention-based
visuomotor planning has been attributed to frontal eye fields
(Zhou and Desimone, 2011). If there were a corresponding hap-
tic planning area, a lesion there might be expected to produce a
pure tactile apraxia. Such an apraxia was described in a stroke
patient who had essentially normal tactile perception and visual
shape comprehension and intact voluntary hand movements but
could not describe the shape of a hidden 3D object that she was
exploring manually (Valenza et al., 2001). It would appear that
haptic knowledge of the world requires more than the sum of the
observable parts.
WHAT TYPES OF ENTITIES CAN BE REPRESENTED?
Is it too much of a stretch to expand the Bayesian
Action&Perception scheme from physical objects that can
be manipulated to all entities that the brain has learned to
identify in its world? The human mind is particularly adept at
understanding both the physical and the interpersonal world
at highly abstracted levels. In order to reach such levels of
abstraction, it seems necessary for the brain to hypothesize that
certain abstractions exist and then to observe that there exists
a class of apparently dissimilar situations that nonetheless lead
to similar sensory feedback when handled in a certain way. For
example, if one wants to identify whether a newly encountered
person is friend or foe, it is probably useful to make a neutral
gesture like smiling or extending an open hand to see what
response is thereby elicited. Bayesian Exploration lends itself well
to integrating multimodal sensory data (Xu et al., 2013; Sinapov
et al., 2014), so it might serve as well to integrate multiple levels
of abstract perception.
Bayesian decision-making has been criticized as a theory of
artificial general intelligence (also known as “strong” AI) because
it is fundamentally limited to induction and extrapolation rather
than creative perception (Deutsch, 2012). We propose (but have
not yet formally demonstrated) that the inverse processes of
Bayesian Exploration and Bayesian Action&Perception can over-
come this limitation. Consider a hierarchical system in which var-
ious ways of exploring an object are themselves entities selected
from initially random behaviors (Marques et al., 2014) according
to how efficiently they characterize a class of objects (in contrast
to the arbitrary exploratorymovements that we programmed into
our texture identification machine). The percepts that are thereby
selected will then depend on the distribution of properties in the
particular set of objects in the machine’s universe rather than a
priori knowledge. That is to say that the machine has discovered
an abstraction about the design rather than just the contents of its
universe.
WHAT CAN ROBOTICS CONTRIBUTE TO NEUROSCIENCE?
The opening question (“Can robots perceive in the same man-
ner as humans?”) implies not just equivalence of performance
but also of means. If the function being studied is sufficiently
sophisticated and the test is sufficiently rigorous, then perhaps the
performance equivalence proposed for the Turing test of human-
like artificial intelligence (Turing, 1950) can only be achieved
through closely related means (but see Deutsch, 2012 for funda-
mental limits of such a demonstration and Horsman et al., 2014
for an alternative approach to experimental testing of theories of
computation). While the computational machinery of robots is
obviously different from that of neurons, there is no reason why
they couldn’t use the same theory of computation (Marr, 1982)
to structure the problem in the first place.
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Haptic functions are difficult to study using the usual reduc-
tionist recording methods in trained subjects (Loeb et al., 2011).
In addition to the usual problems of measuring both the neural
activity and the kinematic details of these complex behaviors, it
seems likely that the neural activity will depend on internal states
that cannot be controlled or measured. These include the entire
prior experience of the subject and the internal hypotheses that
are being tested at any point in time. An alternative experimen-
tal strategy is to test theories of computation for such mental
functions by building biomimetic machines (i.e., autonomous
robots) and by observing whether they generate biosimilar behav-
iors (Avraham et al., 2012; Fishel and Loeb, 2012a; Su et al., 2012).
At the least, this should demonstrate the feasibility, if not the exis-
tence, of the hypothesized neural algorithms. As a bonus, it might
result in some particularly useful machines.
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